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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE - SEARCH AND SEIZURES IN

SCHOOLS, COMMONWEALTH V. VILLAGRAN, 81
N.E3D 310 (MASS. 2017).
The protection from unreasonable searches and seizures without
probable cause is guaranteed to all persons of the United States as well as all
residents of Massachusetts Both the United States Supreme Court and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC"), however, have analyzed
variations in the standards of a reasonable search and seizure in a school
setting. 2 In Commonwealth v. Villagran,3 the SJC grappled with the
distinction between the standard applicable to a police officer's search under
the Fourth Amendment and the less stringent standard applicable to a search
conducted by a school official.4 After articulating the various standards
required in a school setting, the court held when a police officer conducts a
search, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant based on probable cause,
while a search by a school official is permissible under both the Fourth
Amendment and article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights if it is
1 See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IX (stating rights granted under Fourth Amendment); MASS.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 14 (outlining right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures). The
Massachusetts Constitution explains:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of
his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are
contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by
oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in
suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property,
be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest,
or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities
prescribed by the laws.
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 14.
2 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (explaining school official is held to
standard of reasonableness when conducting warrantless search); Commonwealth v. Carey, 554
N.E.2d 1199, 1205 n. 4 (1990) (discussing distinction between standard applicable to school
officials and police officer). "[I]f the search had been conducted by [the police], the warrantless
search would have been lawful under the Fourth Amendment as based on probable cause and
exigent circumstances." Carey, 554 N.E.2d at 1205 n.4; see also Commonwealth v. Villagran, 81
N.E.3d 310, 313 (Mass. 2017) ("[A] police officer's conduct in a school setting is governed by the
traditional Fourth Amendment standard.").
3 81 N.E.3d 310 (Mass. 2017).
4 See id. at 313 (reaffirming distinction between searches done by school officials and police
officers).

2018]

SEARCH AND SEIZURES IN SCHOOLS

367

reasonable under all the circumstances. Thus, when the police officer
searched the defendant in the school setting without reasonable suspicion
and without an exception to the warrant requirement, the search was
unconstitutional.'
In March of 2015, Milton school officials found an unknown male
(the defendant) on school grounds .6 The defendant presented a fictitious
story about why he was on school grounds to the school officials.' As the
principal and vice principal approached the defendant, they smelled
marijuana.8 . After moving the defendant to a secure room, the school
officials called the Milton Police Department and Sergeant Murphy.' Upon
arriving, Sergeant Murphy was informed that the defendant tried to sneak
into the school, and officials suspected the defendant had contraband on him
based on his fictitious story and strange actions.' 0 Sergeant Murphy then
conducted a pat-frisk and found marijuana and $2,964.88 in cash on the
Sergeant Murphy proceeded to pat-frisked the
defendant's person."
defendant's backpack and felt a hard object.12 Sergeant Murphy opened the
bag, fearing that the object was a weapon, and discovered several objects,
including a loaded handgun. 3 Sergeant Murphy removed the gun from the
defendant's bag and placed the defendant under arrest. 14
The defendant was convicted, amongst other charges, of carrying a
weapon on school grounds." The defendant filed a motion to suppress
statements and physical evidence seized during the police search of his
backpack, arguing that Sergeant Murphy lacked a constitutionally
permissible basis for the pat-frisk and subsequent search.1 6 The district court
denied the motion." The defendant then appealed the District Court's ruling,

5

See id. at 314 (vacating defendant's convictions based on unconstitutional search).

6 See id. (explaining school officials observing unknown individual).

See id. (describing how defendant told officials he was waiting for student to meet him).
After twice changing his story, the defendant told the principal and vice principal that he was
waiting for a girl to meet him at school. Id.
See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 314 (noticing strong smell of marijuana). The school officials
became worried about the surrounding students and brought the defendant into a conference room.
Id.
9 See id. (outlining steps taken by school officials).
10 See id. (explaining how defendant lied about his identity and reason for being on school
grounds).
11 See id. at 314 (discussing objects found).
12 See id. at 314 (describing Sergeant Murphy's actions).
'3 See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 314 (recounting Sergeant Murphy's findings).
' See id. at 314 (outlining how Sergeant Murphy spoke to defendant).
15 See id. at 312 (referencing defendant's convictions).
16 See id. at 312 (explaining defendant's motions).
'7 See id. at 312 (relating district court's holding).
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which was transferred to the SJC.15 The SJC motioned, sua sponte, to
transfer the case to their court.1 9
The SJC has explained that although a warrant is generally required
when conducting a search, a warrantless search may be constitutional if it is
justified by probable cause and meets an exception to the warrant
requirement. 20 When a search is conducted without a warrant, it must be
shown that the search can be included in a narrow class of exceptions to the
warrant requirement. 2 1 Police officers must have a reasonably articulable
suspicion that the defendant is engaged in criminal activity and is armed and
dangerous in order to conduct a pat-frisk.2 2 The SJC has clarified that a patfrisk must be justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion that a
defendant is engaged in criminal activity and that the defendant was armed
and dangerous. 2 3 Additionally, subsequent search stemming from a pat-frisk
must be justified by probable cause and an exception to the warrant
requirement.2 4
Further, when a police officer conducts a search in a school setting,
25
they are required to act in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.
See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 313 (detailing out defendant's arguments). The defendant
argued there was a violation of his rights under both the Fourth Amendment of United States
Constitution and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Id.
19 See id. at 313 (describing SJC's decision).
20 See Commonwealth v. Tyree, 919 N.E.2d 660, 670-71 (Mass. 2010) (outlining warrantless
search standard).
18

Given the high value that our Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions assign to the
warrant requirement . . . we impose a heavy burden on the Commonwealth to justify
every warrantless search: in the absence of consent, the Commonwealth must prove both
probable cause . .. and the existence of exigent circumstances . . . . Under the exception
for exigent circumstances, "there must be a showing that it was impracticable for the
police to obtain a warrant, and the standards as to exigency are strict."
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 800 (Mass. 1975)).
21 See Commonwealth v. Craan, 13 N.E.3d 569, 574 (Mass. 2014) (explaining burden is on
Commonwealth to prove exception to warrant requirement). For example, the automobile
exception to warrant requirement allows police to search an automobile if they have probable cause
to believe evidence of a crime will be found. Id. at 577; see also Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 927
N.E.2d 439, 445 (Mass. 2010) (holding search unconstitutional for lack of reasonable suspicion
although armed individual committed criminal offense).
22 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (declaring standard of reasonable articulable
suspicion). "[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Id.
23 See Narcisse, 927 N.E.2d at 446 (Mass. 2010) (explaining what is necessary under
Massachusetts state law for reasonable and articulable suspicion).
24 See Commonwealth v. Cast, 556 N.E.2d 69,76 (Mass. 1990) (outlining exceptions to Fourth
Amendment and Article 14 warrant requirement).
25 See Carey, 554 N.E.2d at 1205 n.4 (Mass. 1990) (distinguishing search executed by school
officials from searches executed by police officer). The defendant argued the detective needed to
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However, when a school official conducts a search in a school setting, the
search is constitutional if it is found to be reasonable under the given
circumstances .26 This relaxed probable cause standard applies only when
school officials are not acting in conjunction with the police .*2 The SJC has
elaborated if a school official is acting in conjunction with, or at the bequest
of, the police, a search warrant and probable cause are required. 28
Courts have also taken judicial notice of actual and potential
violence in public schools.29 Protection against gun related violence in a
school setting is particularly important." The increased frequency of
violence in schools provides the court with a strong justification for a relaxed
search and seizure standard for school officials." Legislation towards
restrictions on guns in schools acts as a legal foundation to address the
prevalent and alarming issue of violence in a school setting.3 2
have reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct in order to search his locker. Id. The court disagreed,
finding the search to have been reasonable because the motion judge found the search was
conducted by school officials with no involvement by police. Id.
26 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 327-28 (holding Fourth Amendment applies to searches
conducted
by public school officials, at lower standard). The court explained
[Aiccommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe
that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of
a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.
Id. at 341.
27 See id. at 334 (explaining reasonableness standard applies
only when school officials not
acting independently from law enforcement). Under the Fourth Amendment, for a school search
to be reasonable it must be justified at its inception and limited in its scope "to the circumstances
which justified the intrusion in the first place." Id. at 341; see also Commonwealth v. Lawrence,
792 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Mass. 2003) (discussing T.L.O. in same context).
28 See Lawrence, 792 N.E.2d at 113 ("Because Ridley was not acting as an agent of the
police,
he was exempt from obtaining a search warrant, and must only demonstrate that the search was
reasonable in all of the circumstances.").
29 See Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967, 973
(Mass. 2001) (explaining highly
publicized school shootings by students have increased awareness of violence in schools).
30 See Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 6 N.E.3d 557, 561 (Mass. App. Ct.
2014) (describing
how Legislature has increased burden on defendants in firearm offenses in school setting).
31 See Milo M., 740 N.E.2d at 974 (describing "climate of apprehension" regarding schools
and violence).
32 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, §10(j) (2018) (explaining
offense).
Whoever, not being a law enforcement officer and notwithstanding any license obtained
by the person pursuant to chapter 140, carries on the person a firearm, loaded or
unloaded, or other dangerous weapon in any building or on the grounds of any
elementary or secondary school, college or university without the written authorization
of the board or officer in charge of the elementary or secondary school, college or
university shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000....
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In Commonwealth v. Villagran, the SJC vacated and remanded the
defendant's conviction because the police officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to support a pat-frisk, and lacked probable cause to support a
33
In addition, the court found the
search of the defendant's backpack.
warrantless search of the defendant's backpack was not warranted as a search
incident to the arrest. 34 Moreover, the court emphasized that the ruling
specifically differentiates between the conduct of a police officer and the
35
conduct of a school official during a search on school property.
Articulating the different standard for police officers and school
officials in a search on school property allowed the court to favor Villagran's
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizures.36 The
court properly applied the Terry standard in requiring the police officer to
justify the warrantless search of Villagran with probable cause and an
37
Additionally, the court's decision
exception to the warrant requirement.
law regarding expectations of
case
prior
of
preference
the
corresponds with
privacy in public places, and the variation in search and seizure standards,
which considers who executes the search if the search takes place in a school
setting."
The court disregarded the dissent's reference to recent incidents of
violence in schools as support for a diminished expectation of privacy in
schools.3 9 The dissent argues a person who is on school property has a
reduced expectation of privacy because public access to a school is restricted,
and the nature of a school calls for a less rigorous constitutional standard.4
However, the majority points to a lack of case law supporting the

Id.
See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 324 (explaining holding).
34 See id. at 323-24 (describing search of defendant's backpack).
3
See id. at 322-23 (outlining differences in standards).
36 See id. at 318 (discussing lack of probable cause to search backpack); see also U.S. CONST.
AMEND. IV; MASS CONST. PT. 1, ART. 14 (outlining right against unreasonable search and
seizures).
37 See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 318 (emphasizing "bedrock constitutional principles" required
for both pat frisk and warrantless search).
38 See id. at 318 (explaining precedent); see TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (holding school officials
do not need to obtain a warrant); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (emphasizing warrant requirement requires
probable cause). The Supreme Court explains that the requirement for probable cause may be
excused for exigent circumstances. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; see also CTyree, 919 N.E.2d at 670-71
(describing high standard necessary to justify warrantless search); Narcisse, 927 N.E.2d at 445
(outlining that police officer must have reasonable suspicion that individual is committing crime
and is dangerous).
39 See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 318 (addressing dissent's focus on recent school violence
episodes).
40 See id. at 324-25 (Lowy, J. dissenting) (explaining individual who enters school should have
reduced expectation of privacy).
33
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unconventional interpretation of the protections required by the Fourth
Amendment and article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.4
The court does not completely disregard the public interest in
protection against violence in schools.4 2 The dissent cites precedent that
references school violence while discussing that a teacher's apprehension
was insufficient to establish the defendant's likelihood to carry out a threat. 4 3
However, as the majority points out, the effect of school violence on the
teacher's state of mind carries no constitutional weight in the legal analysis."
The majority emphasizes that, relevant case law does not permit such
restrictions on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, and a balance
of privacy and a school's interest in maintaining order can be accomplished
without limiting the reasonableness requirement, as the court did in New
Jersey v. TL.O..45 Finally, the court highlights that their ruling is only
directed at searches executed by police officers in school settings, and should
not be read to limit the actions of school officials, who are held to a less
stringent standard.46
In Villagran, the court reaffirmed the standard required for police
officers and the standard required for school officials when executing a
search on school grounds. In emphasizing the difference between the
standards, the court favored the importance of Fourth Amendment and article
14 protections. However, the court effectively acknowledged the public
interest by reiterating the less stringent standard applicable to school officials
during a search on school grounds. Highlighting the difference in standards
protects citizens from future unreasonable search and seizures while
allowing school officials to adequately protect their students.
Brigid Bowser

41 See id. at 318 (addressing dissenting opinion).
42 See id. at 318-19 (acknowledging current violence in schools).
43 See id. at 325 (referencing Newtown, Connecticut school shooting).
4 See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 319 (referencing precedent recognizes impact of school
violence); see also Milo M., 740 N.E.2d at 973 (taking judicial notice of school violence).
45 See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 318-19 (presenting balancing test of safety and privacy); see
also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 330 (outlining standard of reasonableness applicable to warrantless search
by school official).
46 See Villagran, 81 N.E.3d at 320 (emphasizing holding does not restrict what school officials
can do to secure student's safety).

